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IG, APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE BY IG AGAINST HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE [2018] ScotHC HCJAC_63 (18 September 2018)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2018/[2018]_HCJAC_63.html
Cite as:
[2018] ScotHC HCJAC_63,
[2018] HCJAC 63,
2018 SCCR 343,
2018 GWD 32-416
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Page 1 ⇓
Lord Menzies
Lord Turnbull
APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
[2018] HCJAC 63
HCA/2018/000388/XC
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD TURNBULL
in
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
by
IG
against
HER MAJESTY’S ADVOCATE
Appellant: V Dow; Adams Whyte (Livingston)
Respondent: H Carmichael, AD; Crown Agent
Appellant
Respondent
18 September 2018
[1] The appellant in this case is a child aged 14 years. On 25 June 2018, he pled guilty to
charges two, three and four on the indictment which he faced. Each charge arose out of
conduct which took place on 15 September 2017 at a school in West Lothian where the
appellant was at that time a pupil and aged 13 years. Charge two was a charge of having
with him an article which had a blade or was sharply pointed namely a knife, contrary to the
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Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995. Charge three was a charge of assaulting
LG, a 14 year old pupil at the school, by repeatedly punching him on the head and body to
his injury. Charge four was a charge of assaulting RM, also a 14 year old pupil at the school,
by punching him on the head, struggling with him, whereby he was struck on the head with
a knife, all to his severe injury and permanent disfigurement. The appellant was sentenced
to a cumulo sentence of 15 months’ detention, which the sheriff reduced to a period of
12 months to reflect the utilitarian value of the guilty plea.
[2] It was explained to the sheriff that the background to these incidents was that there
had been ongoing issues between the appellant and a particular group of boys within the
school. The appellant had been assaulted in August 2017 by members of this group. This
assault had been filmed on a mobile phone and the film taken had been posted on social
media. Thereafter, the appellant and the complainer LG arranged over social media to meet
for a fight at the school. The appellant’s explanation was that he decided to take the knife
with him in order to threaten any other members of the group whom he believed might
intervene. The incidents described in the charges occurred at around 8.30am in the canteen
area of the school where many other pupils were present. The pupil LG was punched to the
head by the appellant, he fell to the ground and was repeatedly punched on the head and
body. This fight between the two boys was separated and the appellant began to walk away
whereupon the complainer RM approached him asking him why he was hitting the other
boy. RM then pushed the appellant, these two struggled and engaged in a fight together
during the course of which they fell to the ground. During this incident the complainer was
struck on the right cheek with a knife which was being held by the appellant. The incident
was separated by some older boys and the head teacher attended. RM was seen to have a
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notable and serious facial injury and was taken to hospital. He required five stitches to a
deep laceration on his right cheek.
[3] The court was informed at the date of sentencing, some nine months after the
incident, that the complainer still had a clearly visible scar on his cheek of which he felt very
self-conscious. A victim impact statement was provided to the court in which the
complainer explained the impact which the scar to his face has had upon him and his
concerns about the effect that it will have in the future such as, for example, when he attends
for job interviews. The sentencing sheriff also had available to him the advice of the
Children’s Panel, which was to the effect that they would recommend support rather than
punishment and asked for the case to be remitted to the Children’s Hearing system. He also
had a Criminal Justice Social Work Report which suggested that the case should also be
remitted to follow the advice of the Children’s Hearing.
[4] The sentencing sheriff concluded that the offence was of a seriousness that was not
appropriate to remit to the Children’s Panel. Whilst he recognised that the Panel could no
doubt help provide advice and support, he concluded that such a disposal would not
address other important aspects of sentencing. The sheriff recognised that charge four did
not reflect that the injury inflicted was intentional, however he considered that it was of
crucial importance in assessing the appellant’s culpability to recognise that he had
deliberately taken a knife to school in the knowledge that he was to become engaged in a
fight and that he did that in order to threaten any other members of the group whom he
believed might intervene.
[5] Counsel for the appellant contended that the imposition of a period of detention by
the sheriff was excessive and inappropriate. The background circumstances to the offences
were reiterated and it was submitted that the sheriff erred in failing to attach sufficient
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weight to these. It was stressed that the appellant took the knife because he was fearful and
he did not intend to assault anyone with it. The appellant’s own circumstances were
revisited and the efforts which he had made to engage with support services since the date
of the offence were explained and emphasised. It was also submitted that the sheriff had
erred in failing to give sufficient regard to the appellant’s age and the availability of a
disposal which would address the causes of his offending, thereby reducing the risk of
further harm. Counsel referred to what had been said in the cases of Kane v HM Advocate
2003 SCCR 749 and Smart v HM Advocate [2016] HCJAC 73 concerning the approach to be
taken by the court in sentencing a young offender. Counsel submitted that the sheriff had
placed too much weight on the sentencing aims of retribution and deterrence and on the
nature and the seriousness of the offence, rather than having regard to the need for, and the
availability of, rehabilitation of the appellant.
[6] The report from the sentencing sheriff makes it plain that he was fully aware of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences to which the appellant pled
guilty. He described this as a sad and anxious case. The sheriff recognised that a sentence of
detention could only be imposed if no other method of dealing with the appellant was
appropriate and he recognised that his priority was to prevent further offending by the
appellant and to have full regard to his welfare as a child. He concluded that to take proper
account of the appellant’s actions in taking a knife into school, to take account of the terrible
outcome of the incident and the undoubted concern which existed amongst parents, teachers
and others regarding knives being taken into school, it was important for there to be a
measure of punishment for what he saw as a grave crime. He concluded that it was
important for the court to make it plain that the taking of knives into school would not be
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tolerated and would be dealt with seriously. The sheriff concluded that these objectives
could only be achieved by the imposition of a custodial sentence.
[7] We have carefully considered the information provided by the sheriff to us in his
report and we have given careful consideration to the sensitively and well-presented
submissions on the appellant’s behalf in what is plainly a serious and anxious case. We
consider that the background of bullying which was referred to is a relevant consideration
and one which the sheriff ought to have given due consideration to. We are also impressed
by and take account of certain of the comments in the Criminal Justice Social Work Report.
We note, for example, at page 3 of 8 that the appellant was said to have shown a level of
insight into his offending and it is noted that he had engaged in work to address some of the
issues which have contributed towards his behaviour whilst working alongside the West
Lothian Criminal and Youth Justice Team. This engagement, it was said, suggests that the
appellant does recognise the need to accept the consequences of his behaviour. It is also
noted that the appellant has been affected by his involvement with the criminal justice
system and he appears to have recognised the importance of making changes to his
behaviour for the future. The author goes on to note that the appellant displayed a level of
recognition regarding the impact of his behaviour on the victims which was appropriate for
his age and had shown an understanding of the impact of his behaviour on his family and
expressed regret for this.
[8] These are important considerations and are observations which we think can
distinguish the appellant from many of those who are described in such reports. It is also, in
our opinion, important to recognise that there is no background of trauma or abuse or the
like disclosed in the social enquiry report concerning the appellant. The social enquiry
report reflects a good family background and a caring and loving environment. This again
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distinguishes the appellant’s case from, for example, cases such as Kane and Smart. We
recognise the legitimacy of the sheriff’s concerns as set out in his report and which were
canvassed with counsel appearing on the appellant’s behalf. But we accept and agree that
he has failed to adequately balance these concerns against the positive elements contained
within the social enquiry report to which we have drawn attention.
[9] Nevertheless, the circumstances of the offences disclose a serious matter and given
the consequences of the appellant’s conduct we do not think it is appropriate to remit the
case to the Children’s Panel. The court would wish to keep control of the disposal of the
case and to be in a position to revisit that if necessary. That having been said, we are
prepared to give effect to the submissions advanced on the appellant’s behalf and to quash
the sentence of detention imposed. In its place we shall impose a Community Payback Order
with a supervision requirement for a period of 18 months.